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The War Reserve System is designed to provide the Marine
Corps with materiel support in the event it is committed to
combat operations. An understanding of this system is
essential not only for those who operate it, but also for
those Marines who will be the recipient of its output.
This thesis examines the War Reserve System in its four
major phases of materiel requirements determination, attain-
ment and storage of assets, asset withdrawal and distribution,
and the replenishment of supplies in the combat objective
area. Problem areas within the system are analyzed and
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The opinion exists among Marines, especially those
unfamiliar with the logistics system, is that in time of war
vast quantities of new materiel will be available to those
units assigned to combat. This opinion is correct only
to the extent that the Marine Corps has a good deal of
money invested in assets to be used in wartime. The mis-
understanding involves the purpose of this materiel.
Often the imperfect condition of peacetime equipment is
rationalized by a trusting faith that new, combat-ready
equipment is being stored somewhere for use as immediate
replacement items in the event of mobilization. In reality,
these items exist as prepositioned assets which are to serve
instead as a protection level of stock during the initial
weeks of a combat operation or as the initial issue
allowance for reserve units being activated.
The appropriate extent of such assets is difficult to
determine. Obviously, a trade-off must be made between
peacetime efficiency and wartime potential since constraints
exist in any logistics system. Balanced feasible solutions
must be found during peacetime since, in the event of war,
the time may not exist for making corrections.
13

As with any program within the IVIarine Corps, the War
Reserve System is governed by specific policies, regulations,
and directives. Many are the result of guidance prescribed
by higher command levels outside the Marine Corps hierarchy.
By examining these guidelines, it is possible to understand
the reasons behind the functioning of the war reserve
concept as it applies to the Marine Corps.
An examination of the major operational processes that
constitute the entire Marine Corps logistics system will
provide an opportunity to identify problem areas and bottle-
necks that could exist in the event of war. The concern is
to recognize constraints that may affect the flow of
material from the storage sites to the consumers. This will
involve an examination of the various levels of stock
management and how they are equipped to shift from peacetime
operation to wartime mobilization. This is especially
important for the Corps in light of its requirement to be a
"force in readiness".
B. OBJECTIVE
Since a significant number of readers may not understand
the function of war reserve stock, the objective of this
thesis is to examine the Marine Corps War Reserve System
and to illustrate how it functions. The desire here is to
present an understanding of how wartime requirements are
determined and the current attempts being made by Headquarters,
1^

Marine Corps to ensure that these requirements are attained,
positioned, and deliverable to the combat units in a timely,
effective manner.
C. SCOPE
The complexity and pervasiveness of the Marine Corps
War Reserve System limits the detail with which this analysis
is performed. Logistics interaction with other service
branches and Department of Defense agencies is acknowledged
but not analyzed in detail.
The content of this thesis is limited to materiel of an
unclassified nature. Much of the planning and programming of
war reserve materiel requirements consists of classified
material due to the nature of the contingencies involved,
but this information was not considered essential to this
presentation.
The disposition of the Marine Corps Reserves in time of
war falls under the area of classified information and, for
that reason, is not presented in detail. Requirements for
mobilizing and supporting such units are discussed, but the
primary emphasis is placed on the War Reserve System as it
applies to active Marine Corps forces.
D. SUIVIMARY OF CHAPTERS
The initial chapter provides an overview of the environment
of the Marine Corps with emphasis on the logistics structure




The chapters that follow describe and analyze the overall
structure of the Marine Corps ¥ar Reserve System. Chapter
III presents the process of materiel requirements determination,
Once the requirements are known, a process must be imple-
mented to acquire and maintain the corresponding assets.
This phase is discussed in Chapter IV.
The subsequent two chapters deal with the operational
aspect of the War Reserve System; that is, the processes that
are activated in the event the Marine Corps is called to meet
an emergency contingency requirement. Chapter V considers
the time period from initial notification of mobilization
to the delivery of materiel assets to the amphibious area.
Chapter VI considers the follow-on phase during which
resupply is of concern.
The final chapter contains conclusions and recommendations




A. MISSION OF THE MARINE CORPS
The mission of the Marine Corps is highlighted by its
need to provide Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) with air and
ground capacity that allows for the seizure and defense
of advanced naval bases I l:6j.
In addition, the Marine Corps is required to provide
detachments for service on armed Navy vessels, to coordinate
with other services in the development of amphibious warfare
techniques, to be prepared for wartime expansion as per
joint mobilization plans, and to perform other missions as
directed by the President f2:l-lj.
To accomplish these tasks the Marine Corps has organized
itself into three segments: (l) FMF, (2) Supporting
Establishment and (3) Marine Corps Reserve. The emphasis
of this study will not include consideration of the
Supporting Establishment which includes all posts, camps
and stations and is operated under separate operational,
administrative and fiscal guidelines than those of the
FMF [2:I-l] .
The organizational structure that allows for primary
mission accomplishment is shown in Figure 1. The identifica-
tion of a central logistics unit at each level should be noted
since this is the basis for the combat support portion of
an amphibious mission. It should also be noted that the
organization of the Marine Corps Reserve is patterned in the
17

fashion as depicted in Figure 1. Since the Corps maintains
three active wings and divisions, the Reserve is often
referred to as the ^th DWT (Division/Wing Team)
.
The fact that the Marine Corps is required to accomplish
amphibious missions, as assigned by the President, has
created the need for the FMF to be a force in readiness. As
a result, emphasis is placed on its ability to logistically
support a wide variety of contingencies in numerous geographic
areas. This capability is made difficult by the inherent
characteristic of any highly mobile organization, that being
its ability to function with minimum notification [ 55l)'
This applies to all echelons of Marine Air Ground Task: Force
(MAGTF) as pictured in Figure 1.
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GUIDANCE
An essential factor in attaining a state of combat
readiness is the provision for a workable war reserve
materiel system to provide the logistical support for units
engaged in assigned contingency missions to diverse
environments. The Department of Defense has directed the
establishment of such a war reserve system within each branch
of the service.
The annual Defense Planning and Program Guidance (DPPG)
provides the authority for the Marine Corps and the other
U.S. military services to construct their ¥RS ('Afar Reserve
Stock) systems f2:III-l^j. Although requirements are made
known and policies are defined by the DPPG, each service
18
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is given the latitude to implement its own system, to
develop its own computational methods and item selection
criteria, and to allocate required funds.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) assumes
responsibility for determining materiel requirements as
outlined by DOD/JCS directives. These directives are
designed to insure that all of the military services'
responsibilities for supporting forces assigned to Unified
and Specified Commands are uniformly executed [2:2
J.
These
directives recognize the importance of inter-service coord-
ination where an overlapping of systems exists. This is an
important concern of CMC in that he is reliant on other
services to provide transportation of war reserve materiel.
Although each service is given authority to determine,
acquire and manage its war reserve assets, DoD has made
efforts to provide for a common base in order to uniformly
allocate funds within DoD agencies and to insure that, once
allocated, funds are utilized in a method that will provide
some assurance of prioritized acquisition. Some of these
efforts are further discussed in the Logistics Management
Institute's report on Identification of War Reserve Stock
| 4
J
In establishing a base, it is essential to be explicit
about the purpose of those assets to be used as 7^S . JCS
Publication 1 provides the following definition: "War
Reserve Materiel Requirement - The quantity of an item, in
addition to the M-Day* force materiel requirement required
*M-Day--the day when mobilization begins and asset withdrawal
from the WRS begins.
20

to be in the military supply system on M-Day in order to
support planned mobilization, to expand the materiel
pipeline, and to sustain in training, combat, and combat
support operations, as applicable, the approved U.S. force
structure (active and reserve) and those Allied forces
designated for U.S. materiel support, through the period
described for war materiel planning purposes" ('4".12^.
Basically, this definition implies that the need exists
to have stock on-hand during peacetime that will allow
units to accomplish contingency missions as prescribed by
DoD/JCS directives and includes all requirements necessary
to sustain operations until resupply lines can be established
and wartime production reaches a satisfactory level.
Many of the actual time frame considerations regarding
required levels of supply to be maintained are classified,
as are the detailed descriptions of contingency plans
determined by DoD/JCS . However, the important point to make
here is that DoD/JCS makes known the requirements of each
service, and it is the service's responsibility to insure
that materiel required to accomplish these missions is
identified, acquired, positioned, and maintained. In addition,
each service must develop a system that will allow for the
timely withdrawal of such assets.
21

C. STRUCTURE AND CONCEPT OF WAR RESER^/E SYSTEM
1 . Marine Corips Logistics SuiPiDort System (MCLSS)
The Marine Corps' logistics concept emphasizes the
need for it to be readily adaptable to a wartime scenario.
For that reason many procedures for materiel attainment are
similar in both garrison and deployed situations. Commun-
ication lines for both materiel and information flow are
basically the same for both circumstances.
Changes have occurred over the last five years that
have made the MCLSS more compatible with the overall DoD
supply system. The principal change was the shift to a
centralized management and decentralized distribution con-
cept that released a large amount of retail stocks from
Marine Corps control and allowed for direct requisitioning
from DoD-designated integrated materiel managers (IMM).
The Marine Corps maintains IMM responsibility for those
items that were not under the cognizance of any other DoD
agency. This concept will be discussed in subsequent
paragraphs
.
The structure of the MCLSS is basically organized
in three levels: (l) Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC),
(2) Marine Corps Logistics Support Activity (MCLSA) Albany,
Georgia, and (3) the FMF and Supporting Establishment.
The intent of this structure is that policy will be determined
at the HQMC level, logicial support will be provided by MCLSA,
and the using unit will receive the product of these two in
order to fulfill its mission.
22

The MCLSA is the central management activity at the
wholesale level. Its major responsibilities include (a)
acting as IMM for those items unique to the Marine Corps,
(b) providing the centralized accounting required for
acquiring and maintaining these items, and (c) managing the
Marine Corps' WRS system, including requirements determination,
attainment of assets, positioning and distribution of materiel.
The Marine Corps Unified Materiel Management System (MUMMS)
is the tool utilized to accomplish these tasks.
MUMMS goals are "effective management, improved
responsivieness to requirements, accurate and timely infor-
mation for all levels of management and compatibility with
standardized DoD systems and procedures f2:11-8j. This is
accomplished through the implementation of sixteen integrated
subsystems operated at MCLSA. The core of these is
Inventory Control Subsystem 03.
The actual storage, maintenance, and distribution
of materiel is accomplished at the Marine Corps Supply Centers
(MCSC) at Barstow, CA, and Albany, GA. Those items held at
this level are considered to be the "in-stores" elem.ent. The
maintenance support for Marine Corps-managed items and WRS,
including repair, testing, calibration, and packaging, is
accomplished at these locations. Subsystems exist to provide
management information assistance in the execution of these
responsibilities
.
The final level of the MCLSS is the FMF component. All
assets held at this level are known as the "out-of -stores"
23

element and are used for the direct support of using units.
These units are organized in a manner that allows for a
maximum amount of organic support capability where feasible.
As shown in Figure 1, each echeleon of the FMF
possesses a logistics element. The primary element is the
Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The FSSG serves as a
connection between the using units and the DoD system of
IMM's. It also provides maintenance service, supply
management facilities, and other logistic needs to the
using units.
Figure 2a shows the basic structure of the FSSG with
an emphasis on the supply portion. The key to supply
support with the FMF is the Supported Activities Supply
System (SASSY). The premise of SASSY is to relieve the
burden of manual record keeping from the using unit and to
have it performed in a centralized manner by the SASSY
Management Unit (SMU) which supports an entire MAF. This
not only insures standard accounting and requisitioning
methods, but also allows for MAF-wide asset visibility and
redistribution capability. Figure 2b shows a basic schematic
of this relationship.
The general account is primarily the "warehouse" for
stock required by the using units. l'\rhile the SMU calculates
operating levels of stock and reorder points based on the
"days of supply" model used by the Marine Corps, this
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account. In order to replenish this stock, the SMU places
requisitions directly to IIVIM's.
Included in the special accounts shown in Figure 2a
are the operational deployment stocks and the prepositioned
war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS) which are key elements
of the WRS system in the Marine Corps. The operational
deployment blocks contain those items that quality for
stockage under the present criteria. The usage history is
obtained from current peacetime operations.
2. Marine GorDS War Reserve System
As was mentioned above, the function of the Marine
Corps WRS is to provide enough material support to FMF units
engaged in predetermined contingencies. The extent of this
support will allow for continued operation until that time
when resupply lines are established and functioning.
In order to understand the Marine Corps war reserve
concept, it is useful to become familiar with the terms used
in describing the system itself. In some cases definitions
of terms used are taken from DoD/JCS sources and, in that
way, allow for continuity.
The War Materiel Requirement (WMR) is calculated on
an item-by-item basis for the entire period of support
designated for each MAF by the Defense Planning and Programming
Guidance Memorandum. The elements making up this WMR include
the War Reserve Materiel Requirement (WRMR) as well as
peacetime assets (e.g., normal operating stock) and the war
27

materiel procurement capability. This relationship is shown
in Figure 3 [^8:A-3j.
There is no prescribed mix of these three components.
The WMR may be totally satisfied by peacetime assets for one
itme, while another may need excessive augmentation by the
WRMR to meet the needs of a wartime emergency (e.g., ammunition
requirements)
.
The Marine Corps War Reserve Policy Manual P^400.39D
defines war materiel procurement capability (WMPC) as "the
quantity of an item which can be acquired by orders placed on
or after the day an operation commences (D-Day) from industry
or any other available source. " This element becomes more
important when considering the establishment of a resupply
pipeline that allows for continued materiel support for an
indefinite period of time.
The WRMR is the excess materiel needed to be held
during peacetime that will allow for contingency requirements
to be met. In nearly all cases, this materiel is not available
for issue to meet peacetime requirements.
As shown in Figure 3> the ^aTRMR is composed of two
elements: (l) Prepositioned 'i\[RMR and (2) other WRJVIR. The
PWRMR consists of all such stocks held by the Marine Corps,
either in-stores or with FMF units. Those items held by the
Navy (e.g., medical supplies, aviation ammunition) are con-
sidered OVJRMR. Also included in this category are those
Marine Corps requirements prepositioned aboard designated
amphibious assault ships (Landing Force Operational Reserve
Materiel) (LFORM)
.
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In March, 1976, HQMC published a new War Reserve
Policy Manual which significantly changed the procedures
used for computing and managing WRMR. The salient features
of the new policy include the (a) central computation of
both mount-out* and resupply requirements, (b) capability
for rapid withdrawal of initial issue assets needed by
Reserve Units tabbied for mobilization, (c) requisition of
resupply requirements by deployed units, (d) capability to
conduct asset withdrawal simulations, and (e) management
visibility of war reserve status for both mount-out and
resupply materiel.
The basic difference between this concept and the
previous system is the departure from the "push" methods of
resupply. Under the latter system, FMF units maintained
thirty-day mount-out increments of supply and embarked with
these blocks. At prescribed intervals, the stores system
would furnish identical thirty-day blocks to serve as replen-
ishment. The initial replenishment block was referred to as
mount-out augmentation (MOA)
, and all subsequent blocks were
called automatic resupply (AR). Figure 4 shows the structure
of the previous PWR system. The use of these thirty-day
increments is shown.
*Mount-out, as defined in the PTO Policy Manual, is the materiellevel designed to support combat, combat support, and combat
ttlZl'^^
support operations until resupply is established. ^/^enP^^^^^3.ble, It IS attained, prepositioned, and embarked withFMF assault or assault follow-on units. It will usuallv
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The current policy calls for units to deploy with a
sixty-day mount-out and to requisition subsequent needs as
they occur. Units will utilize the logistic support unit
within their echelon for replenishment purposes. Requisitions
not able to be satisfied will be forwarded the MCLSA which
will utilize existing PWRMS to fill the deficiency. If assets
are not available, the requisition is immediately passed to
the corresponding IMM.
The MCLSA will insure that usage data is relayed to
cognizant IMM's on that materiel issued out of PWRMS to meet
resupply requests that will subsequently be provided ex-
clusively by IMM's [8 '.1-7]. In this way, these DoD agencies
are able to properly plan for their own materiel requirements.
The resupply function of the war process is essential.
D. RESPONSIBILITY
1. HQMC
Although the Commandant of the Marine Corps assumes
ultimate responsibility for the materiel readiness of the
Corps, he has delegated the authority to specific staff
officers at the Headquarters level to administer policies
that insure a proper state of readiness. The War Reserve
Manual has listed the duties required of various staff members
regarding the implementation of the war reserve program.
The impetus for staff planning, coordinating, and
programming of war reserve policy is provided by the Chief
32

of staff, HQMC . He receives assistance from the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Operations and for Requirements
and Programs in determining objectives of the WRS system as
they relate to assigned contingencies, troop strength, force
structure, and means of employment (8:l-9j • Budgeting con-
straints are also a major planning factor.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and
Logistics has more specific responsibilities regarding the
realization of war reserve objectives. His duties include
(a) publishing policy directives, (b) developing meteriel
management policies for all classes of supply, (c) monitoring
procurement action, (d) overseeing acquisition and distribution
of assets in conjunction with recommended allocation priorities,
and (e) providing a means of observing status of war reserve
program in terms of objectives realization r8:l-93'
2. Marine Corips Logistics Suip-port Activity (MCLSA)
As was mentioned above, the actual materiel management
of all PWRM held within the Marine Corps Stores System is
performed by the MCLSA. This includes the computation of war
reserve requirements as outlined in HQMC policy.
This management control is also extended to cover the
storage, maintenance, and care for those assets held "in-
stores" at Barstow and Albany. This includes the repair of
serviceable end items and the rotation of assets to operating
forces in order to attain full utility from on-hand inventory.
As a result of being responsible for the physical
well-being of war reserve assets, the MCLA is very involved
33

in the status reporting function of the WRS system. As
stated previously, MUMIVIS is utilized to accomplish these tasks,
3. FMF
The responsibilities of the Force commanders are
similar to those of the Commanding General, MCLSA, in that
they must insure the materiel readiness of those war reserve
assets held at the FMF level. This includes maintenance, stor-
age, and packaging. Since the FMF units generally hold their
sixty-day mount-out, it is essential that these assets be
maintained in a ready-for-issue and ready-for-embark mode.
The Force commanders are responsible for funding and
acquiring those war reserve stocks held at this level and
for reporting the status of that attainment. In acquiring
assets, the FMF commander will use HQMC policy as guidance
and utilize computational assistance provided by the
MCLSA (6:I-lo).
The FMF commander is ultimately responsible for
insuring the accomplishment of those contingency missions
assigned to his Force. This requires an analysis of the task
and the materiel required to perform that task. If currently
held PWRS does not satisfy the foreseen requirements, the
FMF commander is responsible for initiating action to modify
the existing war reserve requirements.
3^

III. MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION
A. CRITERIA FOR ASSET COMPOSITION
In accordance with the Marine Corps mission, the task
organized forces should possess the types of materiel needed
to execute assigned contingency plans. In determining what
type of assets will be required to meet these needs, it is
necessary to identify those items which fall into the "combat-
essential" category.
The construction of war reserve assets must consider the
overall scenario of a combat operation as being more than just
an offensive thrust designed to destroy or incapacitate an
enemy threat. Just as important are the requirements for
supporting and protecting the tactical faction of the force,
for establishing communications within the AOA, and for
maintaining intellifence concerning the action of the enemy.
For example, those units that function in the rear area of
the AOA need items essential to the effective processing of
incoming supplies, parts, and construction materiel ' 8:C-lJ .
The Marine Corps has identified and designated a number
of major end items as being combat-essential in Marine Corps
Bulletin 3OOO.* Those end items in this bulletin are critical
*The purpose of this bulletin is not to list all items that
are required to conduct operations, but to provide for




for mission accomplishment; and, as a result, receive more
intense maintenance and supply attention.
Not included in this bulletin are such items as individual
weapons and equipment, vehicle repair kits, and field ware-
house containers. There is also no categorization of these
items regarding their use by tactical units with varied
missions. While a machine gun is critical for an infantry
unit, it may not rate the same high priority with a combat
service support unit.
By examining the requirements of an assigned contingency,
the commander must determine what items are essential in
supporting the equipment involved and the full quota of
personnel to be utilized in accomplishing the mission. This
will allow for the determination of the range of stocks.
The depth of stocks must be a combination of the expected
length of the operation and the individual procurement lead
times for items meeting selection criteria. The lead time
should be used in conjunction with the anticipated consumption
rate in determining an adequate quantity required for stockage
B. COMPUTATIONAL METHODS
The current resupply policy, as stated in Marine Corps
Order P^^00.39D War Reserve Policy Manual, calls for the
elimination of the "push" system of replenishment via pre-
calculated blocks of supply. It, therefore, becomes extremely
important for the mount-out allowance to be comprehensive in
range and depth. Since every item included in the mount-out
block is considered to be combat-essential, a method of
36

computing a stockage level must be designed that carefully
considers individual usage characteristics.
Since the purpose of the mount-out allowance is to
provide independent support to a committed task force for a
precalculated period of time, the level of stocks must be
based on consumption rates. In nearly all cases these rates
must be attained from peacetime usage data. This will differ,
in most cases, from the attrition rate realized in combat;
and, for that reason, weighting factors are required to bring
the mount-out level to a point that will fit the needs of
the assigned mission.
The way such usage is gathered, stored, and utilized
varies for the different classes of supply and results in the
need for separate computational methods. The various data
collection modes also create the need for different levels of
the Marine Corps hierarchy to assume responsibility for set-
ting specific allowances of PWRMS
.
Table I is used to show the classes of supply as defined
by DoD. Class VI and X will not be considered in further
discussion since items in these classes are not applicable
for Marine Corps war reserve requirements.
In the case of Class I items (subsistence) , all packaged
operational rations (FOR) will be considered as assets to be
used against the total war reserve requirement. Force
commanders will determine the actual level by utilizing troop
levels quoted in contingency plans. The mount-out, held by







cd C O^ J-lp Cd W •H
c CQ rH •• Cd











r-\ ^ o rH o •H
CQ O CD s^ O ft ft r-iH O > Ph cd CQ Cd
O O r-\ • CD O o









- fH « tSl G CQ s
tlD cd rH zs cd > g
c o Cd fe ^ J^ CD pj
•H •H •H o CD -P o
x: S ^ •> X CQ M S
-p CD CQ W 1
o ^ P (D ^ T3








r-i ^ 5jD CQ p* P- •H
CQ CQ Z5 CD in •H •H «. CQ bijO
c C PQ •H •H S H CQ ?-l C
o O ^ +J •H ^ •H W
.H Ph CQ J-( -P •» S O ptH
+J Cd +^ « Cd Cd CQ :3 •>
cd CD H CQ ms (D ^ s^ •> CQ
oc isb^d r-\ > O E-^ CD CD
w CD •• iiD •H Ch C •H
y-^ p . ^H :3 ;^ C CQ CQ •> H S-i
a. cd > H fo (D H O CQ <D CQ O CD CQ
s rS •H Cd ^ 13 H X3 CQ ^ •H P* P >5
<c s TJ Ph H g j: ft O CQ C T3 +^ S^ < r-\X o c 0) rH :3 cd ><^ O CD Cd Cd cd \ ft















o -p c o
•H C CQ oP ?-i CD s 2
fi ^ S
CD 3 ft P 1
s ^ •H M
ft :3 rH P'
•H •• a* TJ CQ (D ?-i
:3 rH W C g •H o
o^ •H Cd Q) J^ ftW O C s •P CD CQ ft
s cu o CD M 4-3 P zs
o o r-\ •» •H c a Cd u mM c Cd g P o T3 S cd
E^ CD ;3 3 O •H r-i C PH r-\ CQ
fin -p TJ CD 3 -P Cd w H (D g
1—
1
03 •H r-i u •H fi Cd ;^ •H Cd
Q:: •H > O p c o in o •H U u
o CQ •H ^ CQ 3 CQ O •H Cd hQ
c/:! 42 TJ -P C s U •1-3 T3 ft P> o
w :3 c (D O § CD Cd CD Cd ^Q GQ f—
1













support troops in combat for sixty days. Considerations
will be made to allow for rotation of stocks since the
shelf -life of the rations is an important factor.
After the initial sixty-day period, fresh rations will
be used in addition to the POR. These requirements will be
determined by HQMC . The fresh ration requirements will not
be included in the WRMR considerations [8:2-3j.
Similarities between the computations used for Class II,
IV, and VII materiel exist since these classes are covered
by the Table of Authorized Materiel (TAM). There is
guidance given here regarding the level of war reserve
materiel required based on historical usage data.
All items listed in the TAM are separated into three
categories: Type I,. II, and III. Type I materiel is
considered to be combat-essential in the sense that it meets
HQMC criteria for stockage as war reserve materiel. Allow-
ances for Type I items are assigned by HQMC and are listed
on each unit's Table of Equipment (T/E). Only HQMC can
authorize modifications to these allowances, although Force
commanders can recommend additions, deletions, or changes to
their T/E's.
Allowances for Type II items, also provided by HQMC, appear
in the individual unit's T/E but serve merely as a guideline
for final approval by the Force commander. Type II materiel
is to be carried with a unit on an "as required" basis, since
much of this type material is also suited for garrison use.
For example, both field desks and executive-type desks are
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considered Type II materiel. The latter would not be
appropriate in a combat scenario, while the field desk
would be an essential item for a combat service support unit
operating a field warehouse.
Type III items do not appear on unit T/E ' s since this
type materiel is used strictly for special contingencies or
conditions. Climatic type equipment, such as cold weather
clothing, is typical. Allowance levels are calculated for
war reserve requirements of units assigned contingencies
requiring such special equipment. During peacetime such
equipment is drawn from a Training Allowance Pool on a
temporary basis.
The computation methods for Classes II and IV are fairly
straightforward. Class II consists of individual weapons and
equipment, organizational clothing, tool kits, test sets
and similar items used by the individual Marine. Class IV
is comprised of field fortification and basic construction
materiel to be used primarily in a combat environment.
Materiel that is deemed suitable for inclusion in the
war reserve assets by HQMC is assigned a Combat Active Replace-
ment Factor (CARF) . This is used in conjunction with the
unit's T/E and predetermined manning levels required for
various contingencies.
Since most of these items are relatively low cost, there
is a good deal of latitude given to the force commanders in
determing requirements that may differ from those cited by
the TAM and T/E. In many cases the commander is well versed
^0

on the combat requirements of a specific unit and recommend-
ations based on such valuable experience would be highly
desirable. It should not be assumed that this is the case
at all levels of command. Since it is required that such
modification be justified in writing, it is not infeasible
to consider making such justifications available to commanders
of similar organizations. This would provide some means of
standardizing the assets held by similar units without doing
away with the advantages to be gained by someone' s personal
judgement or expertise. "Past experience has proven that
requirements determined on any basis other than valid usage
or proven consumption rates result in either feast or famine
when realistically applied to need" [l:39j.
Major end item (Class VII) requirements are computed in
a similar fashion to that used for Glass II materiel. The
main difference is that manning levels are no longer signifi-
cant in the determination of war reserve allowances. Instead,
the CARF is used in conjunction with the T/E allowance for a
given unit. A significant problem arises from the seemingly
harmless mathematical technique of "rounding-off " fractions
when the allowance of an entire major command (Wing or
Division) is calculated. The resulting figure may not coincide
with the aggregate sum of allowances if each subordinate
organization were to calculate its own requirements. This is
a key problem since different contingencies may call for the
utilization of lower echelon forces rather than an entire
MA?. A regiment of six battalions may require 3-^ vehicles
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to support a certain operation. Rounding-off would reduce
the allowance to 3- I^ ^he battalions are allowed .9 or 1
vehicle, the aggregate total would result in 6 vehicles.
With only 5 held as an allowance, one battalion would be
short-changed. This varied density would also effect the
equipment used to support these major and items if the
requirements were based on item density. It is apparent
that the possible contingency that a unit could be tasked
with should be the determining factor. If a smaller than
MAF-level unit can be deployed independently, then it must
hold war reserve assets that will allow it to perform its
mission.
The determination of mount-out requirements of Glass IX
(repair parts) materiel is perhaps the most complex. Approx-
imately 90 percent of all line items held in PWRMS fall into
the Class IX category. At the same time, it must be realized
that these low value items and, for a large part, bin- type
items. This latter feature eases the transportation problem
of getting these items to the AOA,
The problem is basically twofold: (l) determining
proper criteria for stocking parts in the mount-out assets
and (2) insuring that these selected levels will be adequate
for the required time frame (in this case, 60 days). Further-
more, it has been determined that a single policy for all
Class IX items is not feasible and that items such as dry cell
batteries, secondary reparables, and minimum stockage level
(MSL) items need special consideration [8:2-15^.
^2

The implementation of the Marine Corps Integrated
Maintenance Management System (MIMMS) has provided the means
for central computation of repair parts usage at various levels
of the Marine Corps hierarchy. Naturally, the system is only
as good as the input it receives, so it is necessary for
the using units to insure accuracy and timeliness of maint-
enance reporting. This is an area that has received a great
deal of command attention since the MIMMS inception in 1975-
MIMMS has provided a means for digesting the various end
item applications, supply lead times, number of applications
per end item, repair cycle times, and mean time between
failure for the vast span of Class IX parts. All these
parameters are required in computing a suitable sixty-day
mount-out block for use by a contingency unit. It allows for
the computing of a replacement factor for each part. The
resulting factor decks are prepared for end items and contain
the components and parts, along with the number of applications
of each part and the corresponding repair part factor. For
the most part, these factor decks are in a tape format.
The "factor" calculations, performed by the MCLSA, are
sent to the FMF commanders for review in order to assist in
the determination of Glass IX mount-out requirements at the
FMF level The responses of cognizant personnel are analyzed
by MCLSA weapons systems managers for integration into existing
computations
.
A usual response from the FMF is for the including of
"insurance" type items that may not have the usage to justify
^3

being carried in mount-out but whose operational failure
would lead to the deadlining of a mission-essential weapons
system. Under the previous war reserve system, the addition
of such an item in the mount-out block would also mean it
would be carried in those subsequent blocks to be used for
automatic resupply. The current system amends this problem
and allows for more flexibility, thus such items that are
deemed to be necessary insurance should receive a good deal
of consideration.
C. U.S. NAVY INTERFACE
The Chief of Naval Materiel is responsible to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps for providing total aviation
materiel support, medical and dental supplies, and various
other types of materiel. This support is critical for the
Marine Corps' "air-ground team" concept for amphibious war-
fare. Since there exists a dependence of the Na^/y for such
support, it is essential that the Marine Corps realize its
responsibilities as a recipient.
The component materiel provided by the Navy is known as
advanced base functional components (A3FC) and is used for
combat operations and overseas base facilities development.
The Marine Corps is primarily concerned with the former use
and forwards its requirements via CMC to the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO). They are based on initial and direct
support to the mission of the FMF in the amphibious assault,
assault follow-on, and forward objective area as necessary
to increase the force's own capability r8:3-13l.

The input for those ABFC requirements regarding overseas
base developments are made by FMF commanders directly to
the CNO.
Class III items (POL) , as well as the classes to be
discussed ahead, are non-component materiel used for combat
support. All bulk POL requirements for both ground and
aviation items are provided by the Navy.
The ground POL requirements are determined by HQMC and
are f©rewarded to the Navy. These requirements must include
the sixty-day requirements to be carried as PWRMR. Information
must be supplied regarding the rate of consumption to include
type of equipment, average fuel consumption per hour, and
average daily operating time in a combat environment. This
information is available in the TAM. Consideration must be
given to the fact that not all support vehicles will be in
the AOA in the early days of an amphibious operation [8:3-7j.
The aviation POL requirements are calculated by the Navy
and include bulk POL, packaged POL, and other aviation-
related Class III needs. Requirements are based on flight
hour consumption and the anticipated number of flight hours
planned for specific contingencies.
Some Class III items will be carried as Landing Force
Operational Reserve Materiel (LFORM)* and will be prepositioned
*LFORM—selected items of supply, such as rations, field
fortification materiel, and fuel that are pre-loaded onboard
amphibious ships. Quantity is based on requirements of a MAU-
sized force and is only a fraction of the 60-day MO
requirement for that force.
1+5

aboard designated assault ships as part of the mount-out.
The FMF units will carry their o'^m packaged ground POL
where feasible. If storage capability does not exist, these
items will be held in the Stores System.
The policy for providing medical support to FMF units
is described in BUMEDINST 670O.I9 and includes war reserve
policy. The Navy computes requirements for mount-out blocks
based historical usage. Each block is designed to support
3,000 men for 30 days. Augmentation blocks will support
3,000 for 15 days and are provided on an as-needed basis
since the combat resupply system takes affect after 60 days.
The CMC is responsible for coordination FMF requirements with
the Navy.
Similar procedures are used in providing for the wartime
support of Marine units with aviation ordnance items (Class
V (A)). The onus is on the Marine Corps to insure that its
needs are known and to establish the necessary lines of
communication and coordination. It must ascertain whether
the Navy's computational methods will provide support for
the required time frame in conjunction with the resupply
system established for Marine Corps-furnished items.
D. CONTINGENCY CONSIDERATION
The uncertainty of operating in a hostile environment
creates problems for those who must devise a war reserve system
that will be dependable when called upon. The decision must
be made as to whether stocks should be force-fed into an AOA
of if it is more cost-effective to adapt a responsive system
^'6

that will supply requested items in a satisfactory period
of time in order to insure the steady execution of some
unit's assigned combat mission.
The combat-essentiality of each item is a consideration
that must be undertaken. In conjunction with this it is
necessary to judge the essentiality of the contingency itself.
The mission of the Marine Corps has been stated. However, the
question remains as to what tasks are likely to be assigned
to which forces and under what kind of conditions. If, for
example, JCS only has requirements for MAF-sized forces, then
it is unnecessary to compute war reserve levels for small-sized
organizations. This is not the case since MAU-sized units are
continuously deployed in a combat-ready status. Although they
are performing primarily a training mission, a MAU-type force
structure is capable of operating independently in a combat
scenario
.
The mount-out stock must be structured so as to allow for
as much flexibility as possible. If IVIAU-sized units are
included in contingency plans, then the stocks necessary to
output and sustain such a unitmtil resupply can be established
must be readily available.
The scenario of a contingency must be realistically
established in order to examine the characteristics that
may affect the ability to resupply, the potential of the
enemy force, the expected duration of the encounter, the
climate, and the lead time. Not only should expected time
frames be considered, but also the effect of the contingency
being undertaken in "worst case" conditions.
^2

Requirements must be specifically determined for each
unit to be considered and not just obtained by applying a
fractional allowance level that relates to an arbitrary
ratio of the subordinate unit to the major command. The
failure to calculate requirements by specific unit could
result in short-changing an organization of material required
for a specific task. For example, although a MAB may be
approximately I/3 the size of the MAF, I/3 of the MAF allow-
ance for tanks may be inadequate for a tank-oriented
contingency assigned to a MAB-sized unit. If this is the
only feasible method of calculating such allowance levels,
then exception codes must be developed for implementation in
a contingency involving extraordinary requirements [^6:IX-8j.
This problem will be addressed again when withdrawal procedures
are presented.
For some contingencies it will be necessary to activate
reserve units. The determination must be made as to which
units should receive their materiel in a more expeditious
manner, active or reserve. Which type unit can produce the
greatest utility upon receipt of its precalculated reserve
stock?
In the case of the reserve units, initial issue as well
as mount-out must be stored and made ready for issue. The
sooner initial issue is transpired, the sooner training and
organizational assembly of these Marines can be implemented.
A test was performed by the Standard Research Institute
(SRI) \^^j
,
to determine how far available assets could go to
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fill existing deficiencies as well as provide for required
mount-out. The results showed an excellent level of attain-
ment. Upon closer investigation it was discovered that
requirements for outfitting cadre units had been omitted.
This was no small omission since it required about 5»000 line
items to outfit all MAF cadre units with initial issue and
mount-out. This is not to suggest that the withdrawal system
is lacking, but merely to indicate the care that must be taken
in assigning and structuring existing assets to cover all
assigned contingencies, regardless of the size of the force
required.
Finally, as stated previously, funding is a serious
constraint. For this reason a priority system must be established
to ensure that those tasks that are most likely to occur receive
top consideration when procurement is made.
A9

IV. ASSET ACQUISITION AND POSITIONING
A. ACQUISITION
The responsibility for acquiring war reserve requirements
is closely tied with the responsibilities assigned for de-
termining those requirements. The result is that a variety
of agencies become involved with the attainment of the
predetermined requirements of the Marine Corps.
Since the Marine Corps has shifted to the DoD IMM system
of supply support, the acquisition procedure is based on the
submission of PWRM requests to the cognizant IMM. One con-
sequence of this is that the Marine Corps wholesale system
does not stock the entire range of items required to support
the FMF. As a result, the Marine Corps has very little
control over the procurement lead time. Since this will
have a great deal of impact on the replenishment of materiel
in the AOA, it is essential that mount-out assets be con-
structed with consideration for the entire replenishment
process.
As was noted earlier, the FMF commander is responsible
for the developing war reserve requirements and is also
responsible for funding and acquiring that materiel to be
held at the FMF level. For those items that are held by
other agencies, the FMF is not involved in the attainment
process. The majority of these items will be acquired by the
MCLSA and be positioned at the corresponding Supply Center.
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The Navy is required to fund and manage the OIaTRMR held at
Naval facilities or onboard amphibious vessels (LFORM) fl:^9J.
Because of fiscal constraints it is not possible to
attain war reserve assets at a hundred percent level. Even
if funds were available, it would be extremely difficult to
acquire stocks that would account for deficiencies created by
shelf -life expirations, changes to contingency plans,
allowance modifications, and replacements due to obsolescent
materiel.
Since funds available do not allow for full attainment,
HQMC provides guidance for acquisition by specifying priorities
of contingency missions in the annual planning and programming
package f 8:1-5)'
The primary problem is that there is no Marine Corps -wide
policy for determining the priority of acquisition on an item-
by-item basis. Although the attainment level for mount-out
stock held on the FMF level is above ninety percent, there
still exist major deficiencies at MCLSA level regarding the
requirements of the ^th DWT (^1:51>53).
B. FISCAL CONSTRAINTS
To attempt to solve the problem of filling all known
requirements within allotted funds is an impossibility. As
a consequence, it is important to apply existing funds in a
manner that optimizes the potential output of the war reserve
system regarding its capability to meet the most important
contingency demands. Contingencies must be considered not
only by tactical importance but by probability of occurrence.
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The notion also exists that if forces are able to
satisfactorily execute contingency requirements with existing
assets, then perhaps those requirements that remain in the
status of being "unfunded deficiencies" are not really
necessary. Since the uncertainty of war remains, it is fool-
ish to underestimate what materiel may be required even if
timely acquisition seems out of the question. Naturally, more
effort should be expended on effectively utilizing available
funds; but it is essential that all requirements be made
known since funds may become available in a wartime situation.
Not only must decisions be made regarding allocation of
funds within the war reserve system, but also consideration
must be given to the effective operation of the peacetime
logistical system. It has been noted that existing operating
stocks are an important component of the total war reserve
structure. There is a trade-off between the disposition of
funds to active forces for immediate utilization and the
investment of the same funds to prepositioned stockpiles of
assets whose use is restricted to an emergency situation. It
was noted in the Logistics Management Institute report [^j
that, in 1972, the Army had provided funds for only 4? percent
of its calculated war reserve requirements. No doubt this
could be improved at the expense of the readiness state of its
operating forces, but whether this would improve the overall
ability of a designated task force to meet its objective
in combat is debatable. The key is providing a system that
allows the funded percentage of war reserve stocks to meet
the most likely contingency in the most effective manner.
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C. UTILITY OF INVENTORY
1 . Stock Rotation
l^Tith increasing technology, rapid changes have been
made throughout the Marine Corps. The scope of change from
complex weapons systems to the individual equipment worn "by
a Marine in combat. Each end of this spectrum presents a
different problem for the Corps in its effort to operate an
effective war reserve system. Often equipment becomes
obsolete and must be removed from PWRMS before it has ever
received use. In the case of a new weapons system, not only
is the end item obsolete but also the collateral equipment
and repair parts
.
It has been mentioned previously that it is generally
desirable to maintain PWRMS separately from operating stocks
and in a ready-for-issue state. Since both the PWRMS and the
peacetime stock are in many cases similar by type, the War
Reserve Policy Manual has instructed that such stocks should
be combined and that rotation be instituted in order to gain
satisfactory utility from all assets procured [8:C-2].
Discussions with cognizant logistics personnel have
indicated that steps have been taken to implement the WR
Policy Manual instruction. For example, peacetime stock
deficiencies in Class VII end items are being filled with
mount-out assets. This results in a requisition for a mount-
out replacement vice a T/E replacement. As a consequence,
since most end items held in mount-out are considered to be
combat-essential by Marine Corps Bulletin 3OOO , the peacetime
readiness status of the operating forces is at a higher
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level. By having the assets in the hands of the operating
forces, training can be maintained at a steady pace. Over-
all readiness is not affected since the total war requirement
is a combination of operating stocks and prepositioned assets.
This process is facilitated by the system utilized
for the combined storing of like assets at the MCSC's. The
materiel is classified into three major categories or
"purpose" codes, (1) operating stock (Purpose Code-A) , (2)
allowance items (Purpose Gode-C), and (3) mount-out items
(Purpose Code-D). The operating stock is used to replace
FMF deficiencies. The Purpose Code-C items are for the
initial allowance issue of inactive units. The system
allows for asset visibility and eases the problem of stock
rotation.
2. Maintenance and Storage
The previous section discussed the relative ease in
accomplishing stock rotation for major end items. This is
not the case with other classes of supply that require
elaborate preservation, packaging, and packaging (P, P and
P) requirements.
As stated previously, the Marine Corps is tasked
with being a force in readiness and, as a result, is very
conscious of embarkation requirements. In the chapter to
follow, emphasis will be given to the importance of attaining
a high level of packaging prior to the call for mobilization
in order to decrease the workload of embarkation preparation.
As a result, items are packaged in watertight containers,
5^

equipment is individually packed to prevent rust, mildew,
and similar problems. The cost of such ?, ? and P is
insignificant
.
For this reason, most mount-out held at the ?M?
level is going to be inaccessible. This proves to be ad-
vantageous when considering that mount-out is not meant to
be issued except in emergency conditions. 3y storing accurate
inventories of combat-essential items in sealed and secured
embarkation containers, the assurance of availability is
maintained.
The drawback of having to store a mount-out in such
a fashion is that the range and depth of these stocks is
subject to change, since current policy requires at least an
annual review of war reserve requirements. In addition, as
nev/ equipment is developed the obsolete materiel must be
replaced. As usage calculations for Class IX items are
updated, the structure of that particular class of supply
is modified for war reserve purposes. If the mounx-out is
not kept current with regard to the state of the art, then
it may not be sufficient in meeting the combat needs of a
deployed unit.
Additional storage problems are faced at the
wholesale level where greater quantities of ?lv"RMS must be
held for the purpose of providing initial issue and mount-out
assets for the ^th DWT units. Accomodations must be made
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for shelf -life* items that require special storage conditions.
Reference 1 identified the results of an analysis of items
with a shelf -life code that are maintained "in-stores".
Table II shows the breakdown of those items.
Tyye Items Line Items Dollar Value
Clothing 118 $5,000,000
Dry Cell Batteries 34 2,100,000
Parachutes 3 13^,000




WAR RESERVE SHELF -LI?E ITEMS
FOUND IN STORES SYSTEM fl:6?)
TABLE II
In order to protect these items, especially clothing
and batteries, special warehouses having controlled temperature
and humidity must be provided.
D. ASSET POSITIONING
Once assets have been acquired and designated to be war
reserve stocks, the problem remains as to where these assets
should be physically stored until the time comes when
mobilization is necessary. l'\fhenever possible, the unit in-
volved should have ready access to all mount-out assigned to
it for use in a predetermined mission. This would minimize
transportation requirements in the event of mobilization, and
it would allow the deploying unit to know exactly the status
of its assets.
*Shelf-life - a term used to describe items that will need to
be replaced after a predicted period of time due to deterior-
ation, decaying, or loss of potency (medicines).
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Naturally, this capability does not g^jarantee that assets
will "be in the necessary state of readiness., Mamy items held
in sixty-day mount-out require the kind of warehousing pro-
tection and care that cannot ce supplied by a using unit
supply account.
In many cases the expertise is not available at this level
to ensure that requirements are met, that funds are judiciously
allocated, and that proper care-in-storage programs are im-
plemented. For this reason the ceni:ralization "Cheory of
management is utilized and mount-out stocks for using units
are maintained in a central location at the corresponding
rSSC-. This not only allows for a pooling of talents required
to effectively maintain mount-out stocks, but also puts the
storage site in close proximity with the C-eneral Account,
thus allowing for rapid replenishment of obsolete shocks
and for quick delivery of assets filling existing deficiencies.
Jor the most part, This procedure orily applies to Class II
and nC materiel, much of which is maintained in standard
sized containers and is easily stored. Class VII items
maintained as par^ of the sixty- day moun^-oui; are found
basically in t//o locations: (l) with the ?MF at the
corresponding ?SSG and (2) at either of the two supply
centers at Bars tow, CA and A.lbany, CA.
It -.fas noted ~ha~ although the ?SSG is aware of the status





"•" the uni~3 with any type of status report regarding
"-out ma~eriel to be used by them for specific
7

contingencies. The need to have some sort of feedback to
the unit commanders is essential.
The following table gives samples of several of the
items which are not readily accessible to contingency
organizations operating from Fleet Marine Force Atlantic
bases:
TABLE III
Activities Holding II MAF Mount-Out Assets (l:78]
Tvipe Materiel
MCI Rations (less LFORM)
























Class V requirements present additional problems since
prepositioned war reserve assets are maintained at Naval
facilities. Despite this fact, the Marine Corps maintains
responsibility for the physical transport of conventional
ammunition to the AOA and for insuring coordination with
other services regarding the inventory accounting and
maintenance support for this class of materiel [8:2-8?. For
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the II MAF allowances along, three locations, Naval Ammunition
Depot (NAD) Crane, NAD Hawthorne, and NAD McAlester, hold a
portion of the requirements.
Another significant problem regarding asset positioning
arises when considering the requirements necessary to effect
a mobilization of the 4th DWT. Current policies allow for
fifty percent of required T/E allowances (initial issue)
and sixty-day mount-out stocks to be positioned at each of
the supply centers (Barstow and Albany). This is not an
actuality since a greater proportion (70 percent) is currently
resident on the West Coast \6:lX-7].
The cause of this leads back to the extensive build-up
of stocks at Barstow to support the Vietnam conflict and then
the sudden evacuations of materiel from that region which led
to the subsequent storage of those assets at Barstow again.
Fiscal constraints currently preclude the transshipment of
the excess percentage to Albany; and, as a result, it has
been left to the process of attrition to bring about the
balance.
In the event of a European scenario, a great burden would
be placed on Barstow to arrange for the withdrawal of assets
for not only I MAF, but also for a lion's share of the 4th
SWT requirements. The attendant manpower, materiel handling,
transportation, and equipment testing requirements would be
substantial.*
*In the simulation run by Stanford Research Institue, it was
found that about 22 percent of the Materiel Release Orders
(MRO) processed were for stocks located on the opposite coast




The final asset positioning consideration involves the
materiel that is preloaded on amphibious ships as part of
the Landing Force Operational Reserve Materiel (LFORM) Pro-
gram. The purpose for preloading this materiel is threefold:
(1) reduce embarkation time for MAGTF ' s , (2) prevent
repetitious cargo handling of heavy, bulky items, and (3)
preposition items in AOA that would be hard to expedite if
it was necessary to build up from the usual Battalion Landing
Team (BLT) afloat to a full MAB [5:222]. Assets involved
include Classes III, IV, and V but are limited in their
support capability. The Class III stocks are all drummed
and include two days' supply of gasoline and four days'
supply of diesel fuel. The field fortifications and
ammunition constitute fifteen days of supply for a BLT.
All materiel is considered as part of the sixty-day mount-
out, with the remainder to arrive by other means.
Since the LFORM is not designated for use by one specific
unit, it is difficult to establish control procedures to insure
serviceability, especially since rotation of stock is not
accomplished. .The tendency is to take the availability of
such assets for granted; and, as a result, timely verification
is not performed. Since it is nearly impossible to predict
which units would be embarked on amphibious ships , it is
difficult to attempt to fashion the LFORM blocks in other
than a standard battalion landing team (BLT) form. The
utility of these assets needs to be determined by some
means since they are competing for valuable cargo space
aboard the Navy's vessels.
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V. WITHDRAWAL AKD DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
A . GENERAL
The withdrawal (issue) of assets from PWRMS is the critical
process for the success of the War Reserve System. Assuming
that requirements have been properly determined and that
attainment has reached a satisfactory level, the system is
entirely dependent on the capability to provide materiel in
a ready-for-issue condition in a prescribed time frame.
A great deal of uncertainty is involved with the requirements
determination phase since contingencies can only be planned
using estimation as a basis. There can never be absolute
confidence as to whom the enemy might be and what it will
take to defeat him.
When considering what is required to successfully
complete a withdrawal of prepositioned assets, the problem is
somewhat changed. The constraints are more concrete since
the quantity of materiel available is known. The factors
that may not be known include (a) how much manpower will be
required, (b) how long will it take to prepare equipment for
issue, (c) how much materiel handling equipment is necessary,
(d) how long will it take to package the materiel to be
shipped, and (e) what types of transportation are available
to get the materiel to its required destination. These are
just several of the factors that must be considered in order





The withdrawal process begins with a notification
message to the MCLSA at Albany by the FMF commander. The
request for the release of war reserve assets is usually
initiated by the Commander-in-Chief of one of the Naval
fleets (l:86] and is approved by the GNO and CMC. Once
they are apprised of this approval, the FMF commanders notify
those activities holding their prepositioned war reserve
assets and provide the data required by the holding activity.
The data elements provide information regarding the
contingency in effect, the size of the unit involved, what
type of materiel is required, shipping instructions, the port
of embarkation to be used, funding data, packing instructions
and several other key items required by personnel at the
supply source.
This notification message with its contained data
elements activates the MUMMS system of inventory packages
that interprets requirements, identifies assets, processes
release orders, and allows for the physical preparation of
materiel for shipment.
A more detailed discussion of this operation and the
inherent constraints of the system follows.
B. TYPICAL SCENARIO
The scenario to be described is the one that was used by
the Stanford Research Institute in its 1977 study of the
Marine Corps' Materiel Throughput Distribution System [6].
As stated there, the situation presented is not meant to
relate to strategic thinking by higher headquarters or to
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suggest any political implications of DoD planning. It is
merely a possible scenario and will be used as a reference
point for considering reasonable timeframes for the mobil-
ization of the ?MF and the activation of the ';Var Reserve
System. Figure 5 shows a timetable of the events associated
with this scenario.
.^ 33 Days ^
'<-- 10 Days —/'-— 8 Days
'
A-Day M-Day E-Day D-Day
'
P-Day
SCHEMATIC OF KEY EVENTS
FIGURE 5
A-Day represents the day when FMF Headquarters first
receives warning orders regarding the mobilization of units
within those commands. M-Day has been defined previously
as the day when withdrawal of materiel actually begins at
Barstow and Albany. E-Day is considered to be *he day when
embarkation of the first MAF units begins. Ideally, materiel
is withdrawn with the proper priority of need in mind, and
those units who need their stock first should receive it
first. D-Day represents the day when MAF units begin
operations in the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). The
final specified event is P-Day and is described by DoD
publications as the point in time at which production,




The scenario involves all three MAF ' s plus the requirement
for mobilization of the ^th DWT. Assignments for these
reserve units are not specified since this information is
of a classified nature. Location for the wings, divisions,
and support groups of the three active MAFs are as follows;
I MAF - Camp Pendleton (main division and FSSG elements);
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) El Toro (main
wing elements); Marine Corps Base Twenty-nine
Palms and MCAS Tustin (other ground and air units).
All "bases located in California.
II MAF - Camp Lejeune (main division and FSSG elements);
MCAS Cherry Point (main wing elements); MCAS New
River and MCAS Beaufort (other ground and air
units). All bases located in North Carolina except
Beaufort, SC
.
Ill MAF - Okinawa (main division and FSSG elements) and MCAS
Iwakuni , Japan (main wing elements). Several
Marine Corps bases are located on the Japanese
island of Okinawa.
The possible Ports of Embarkation (POE) that would be
used by deploying forces include, on the East Coast, Wilmington,
NC; Norfolk, VA; Charleston, SC ; Jacksonville, FL ; Gulf Port,
MS; and the facilities used by the Marine Corps at Camp
Lejeune and Moorehead City, NC . On the West Coast, the POEs
are San Diego, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Port Hueneme and Camp
Pendleton, CA.
The scenario calls for the transportation of II MAF, as
the assault force, to an amphibious objective in Denmark. The
landing would take place in conjunction with NATO forces.
The forces of I MAF would constitute the follow-on element.




The assignment of PWR materiel to support FMF forces is
done on a priority basis in the following order: II MAP,
I MAF, III MAF, and the 4th DWT.
C. OPERATION DESCRIPTION
MUMMS is designed to allow for an interface of the ¥ar
Reserve Subsystem (SS-ll) and the Inventory Control Subsystem
(SS-03).
Subsystem-11 is comprised of files that contain the
mobilization requirements for all planned contingencies.
The files have the capability to store information regarding
equipment densities, replacement factors, force configurations,
and withdrawal plans. This information allows for the cal-
culation of quantitative requirements for various items.
For example, the file that contains equipment density
information on items that require repair parts support shows
the density of a combat-essential item at the division, wing,
and force troops level. When this file is used in conjunction
with the replacement factors file, it can compute repair
parts requirements, by NSN , for a specific end item as
deployed in a certain size force.
Subsystem-11 allows for assets to be withdrawn through
four designations: (l) withdrawal plan, (2) force strata
code, (3) edit code, and (4) materiel identification code
(MIC).
The withdrawal plans are limited to three and are concerned
with the size of the force to be supplied. Plan 1 designates
requirements for an MAF, Plan 2 for an MAB and Plan 3 for an
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MAU. There is no device available that allows for any
variations on an MAF-sized force, such as the deletion of
a certain battalion-sized support element for employment
elsewhere.
The MA3 and MAU requirements are computed as one-third
and one-ninth respectively, of the total IVIAF requirements.
With a method such as this, the means used for "rounding-off
"
become very critical, especially at the MAU level, for
low density items.
Force strata codes identify a certain type of mobilization
materiel. These include mount-out and resupply requirements
for active and inactive forces and initial issue requirements
for inactive units. These initial issue assets would be
used to fill T/E deficiencies for reserve units of the ^th
DWT.
Edit codes identify specific types of unit organizations
(e.g., infantry battalion, combat engineer battalion,
helicopter squadron) and are used only with the inactive force
requirements. This means that active forces cannot have
requirements calculated any more precisely than by division,
wing, or force troop within a MAF , MAF , or MAU f6:IX-9]. For
example, if an active MAU required augmentation in the form of
a single infantry company, the requirements for that company
could not be calculated since edit codes do not exist for
active organizational units.
The identification of specific types of materiel is
accomplished by the use of an xMIC . Table lY lists the
ee

various categories of materiel that can be withdrawn by
Subsystem-11 using an MIC.
These elements are included in the notification message
and are processed in order to obtain the materiel requirements
by item and quantity for a specific force structure. These
requirements are the input for the Inventory Control
Subsystem-03.
Subsystem-03 locates the materiel in the "stores system"
and forwards Materiel Release Orders (MRO) to the appropriate
Supply Center. Since a greater portion of the assets are
located at Barstow, it is difficult to predict the number of
MRO
' s that will be produced for either of the storage
locations
.
The location and selection of items is followed by a
preparation process that will vary depending on the type of
item. The most time-consuming involves those items with oper-
ational test codes (OTC) and range from OTC-1 through OTC-3.
The table below depicts each category:
CODE REQUIREMENT EXAMPLE
OTC-1 test/inspect trucks, engineer equipment
OTC-2 inspect & calibrate communication equipment
OTC-3 calibrate measuring devices, test
equipment
Currently, there are no allowances in the withdrawal system
to give such equipment any preference in selection priority.
Some equipment can require nearly one hundred hours of








C Miscellaneous General Articles
D Dry Cells
F Field Fortification
G Type 3 General Articles
H Parts Peculiar to Critical Low
Density
I Individual Clothing
J Type 3 Cold Weather Items
K Common Selected Items with Three
or More Applications, Other than
Those Included in MIC ' s B and H
L Lumber
M Airlift Materiel




S Maintenance Float (D) Float Allow-
ance Items Other Than Those
Included in MIC H
U Organizational Clothing and II
Individual Equipment
V Chemical Warfare Items II, VII
W Preservation, Packing, and II, IV
Packaging













II, IV, VII, IX
IX
II, IV
II, IV, VII, IX
II, IV, VII. IX
IX

This problem will be discussed further when manpower
requirements are considered.
Additional workload requirements are realized when MRO '
s
find items to be not in stock (NIS) or not ready for issue.
This requires the initiation of procurement action if stocks
are not available at the other Supply Center. In many cases,
it may be more efficient to procure deficiencies from an IMM
than to request delivery from the opposite coast Supply Center.
Transportation considerations are essential, especially since
the transportation system would be under strain during a
wartime mobilization.
The SRI study on the Throughput Distribution System cited
several deficiencies in the MUMMS operation. The main area
of concern dealt with the priority of processing requirements.
The system is unable to distinquish which units are deployed
first or which units are initially prepared to accept their
war reserve assets. In addition, there is no allowance made
for deciding which unit is to wait for procurement action in
the case of item deficiencies. A system for prioritizing the
withdrawal sequence is recommended [6:IX-13].
This would prove to be a difficult task since it would
have to be considered from both the operational and logistical
viewpoint. Those items that require special handling and
preparation may not be as critical in a combat situation as
another item. If no coordination is undertaken, the process
of preparing the assets for distribution will be performed in
a manner deemed feasible by the logistics faction.
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The activation of the MUMMS subsystems is the most complex
part of the withdrawal phase and deals only with those classes
of supply maintained in the Marine Corps Stores system (i.e.,
II, IV, VII and IX)
.
The remainder of prepositioned stock held by outside
agencies is requested by the FMF commander. This predeter-
mined quantity is based on the size of the force used for a
specific contingency. This materiel includes rations,
ammunition, bulk fuel, medical supplies and other materiel
managed outside of the Marine Corps.
This author could not determine if a formal communication
link exists or can be arranged that would allow for confir-
mation to the FMF commander of his war reserve withdrawal
requests. This drawback is of the same nature as the lack of
status reporting on these same assets. Thus, the FMF
commander apparently has no way of knowing what the state of
his mount-out will be upon arrival at the port of embarkation
(FOE) for those items that are not held at FMF locations.
D. SUPPLY CENTER FUNCTIONS
Subsequent to determining the on-hand availability of assets
and citing the corresponding location through the use of an
MRO , the materiel must go through a series of stations to
prepare it for shipment to the staging area or POE
.
The major parameters affecting this portion of the
operation include manpower and materiel handling equipment
(MME) availability, and the amount of packaging required.
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The SRI devised a model [6 j that could be used to conduct
sensitivity analyses regarding the length of time required
for asset withdrawal as a function of these parameters. This
Logistics Support Base (LSB) Model is capable of simulating
the mobilization process based on work standards and flow
rates provided by personnel at the two Supply Centers. The
results of that analysis are described below.
1. Man-power Requirements
It is necessary for each Supply Center to be aware of
the workload requirements for each contingency prior to any
actual withdrawal being undertaken. The LSB Model, or a
similar simulation model, can allow for such information to
be made available and can help to insure that the system will
function as designed.
The availability of manpower is a key element in the
analysis of the time required for physical processing once
the assets are located. This processing time will, of course,
vary depending on the issue area from which the item was
selected. These issue areas include bin, bulk, sets, kits,
and chests, OTG-1, and OTC-2 and -3.
The manpower requirements for each issue item are
different and require various levels of skill. The assembly
required for sets, kits, and chests is time-consuming but not
as technically demanding as the performance of operational
tests on OTC equipment. In addition, many major end items
require collateral equipment to be included with the item




Since most Marine Corps-controlled mount-out stock is
located with the FMF units, a withdrawal of any active forces
would require a relatively minimal amount of effort by the
Supply Center. The major effort for such a commitment would
involve supplying assets for existing T/E deficiencies of
active units and assets required for the initial outfitting
of any cadre units being activated.
In the case of full mobilization of the ^th DWT , the
workload would be substantially increased. Not only would
sixty-day mount-outs be required, but, more importantly, a
complete initial issue of T/E assets would be required.
For this reason contingency plans have been developed
with local and state labor resource boards to allow for the
required labor augmentation to be available in order to meet
such demands. The effect of the timeliness, quantity, and
quality of such a task force must be considered since the
Supply Center is constrained by classified timeframes that
must be satisfied in withdrawal of assets.
The sensitivity of the labor augmentation is displayed
in Figure 6. It can be seen that with a twenty-day delay in
labor augmentation the workload lag is not as critical as it
would seem.. After forty days, the base case has processed
ninety-five percent, while the labor-delayed case has attained
an eight-five percent level. Over the next twenty days both
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The figure reveals that it takes at least one month
for the augmentation cases to process the final five percent.
This can be attributed to a need for major repairs on end
items, procurement requirements for completion of sets, kits,
and chests, or high procurement lead time for deficiencies due
to warehouse denials.
Since the processing of bulk items and OTC items is
very labor intensive, the case where labor is delayed for
twenty days is not able to keep pace with the full augmentation
case.
2. Pre-packaging Requirements
Research performed by SRI (6) revealed the importance
of maintaining a high level of prepackaging. In that study
simulations were performed to determine the amount of time
required to prepare individual line items for shipment. A
spectrum of items was used since the packaging and preparation
requirements will vary depending on the characteristics of
the items.
By analyzing the different procedures, the study was
to provide feedback to the Supply Centers regarding recommended
groupings of line items to accomodate the P, P & P processes.
The simulation was performed several times after incorporating
recommended modifications in order to find an optimal time
for a specific withdrawal requirement.
Sensitivity analyses were performed using various levels
of prepackaging in order to determine the effect on total
time required to complete withdrawal. In particular, the
study provided information regarding such an analysis testing
7^

the time of withdrawal for the assets of the ^th DWT as
shown in Figure ?•
The seventy-five percent level is currently maintained
at the Supply Centers and exceeds the minimum requirement
of seventy percent recommended by SRI [6:VIII-8]. Once the
level falls below that, the time delay becomes significant
in order to attain similar stages of withdrawal completion.
E. TRANSPORTATION COORDINATION
1. General
The withdrawal and distribution of assets is not
complete until delivery has been made to the AOA. Once
the preparation and packaging phases has been completed
at the Supply Centers, the FMF units, and those DoD agencies
holding mount-out for Marine Corps units, the problem of
transporting the materiel must be solved.
Basically, the Marine Corps is dependent on three DoD
organizations for providing ample transportation support for
wartime cargo. The three are: (1) Military Transportation
Management Command (MTMC), (2) Military Airlift Command (MAC)
and (3) Military Sealift Command (MSC). Certain Marine
commands have the authority to apply to those organizations
for transportation from supply sources to staging areas or
ports of embarkation (POE). In addition, the requirements
must be made known by the Marine Corps for transportation
to the AOA [6:V-2l. The coordination between the Corps and
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The scenario presented in a previous paragraph in
this chapter suggested a European theater of action for II
MAF and I MAF. This would call for a movement of assets to
Camp Lejeune, NC , for staging, a transportation of materiel
to designated POE ' s on the East Coast, and a trans -Atlantic
air- or sealift to the AOA.
2. Continental United States (CONUS) Movement
When feasible, the Marine Corps would use its own
assets to effect transportation from Supply Centers to the
staging area or to the POE. Accommodations for materiel
unable to be provided through the MTMC since the MTMC is
responsible for coordinating CONUS transportation. Contracted
highway, rail and air carriers would be used.
A significant problem for the Marine Corps is providing
resources for loading and unloading materiel at the nodes.
Not only will personnel be required, but materiel handling
equipment as well. The personnel available at the logistics
activities would have to be augmented by Marines, possibly
combat organizations, in order to expedite the process. This
would no doubt cause confusion since certain operational
requirements would exist for these Marines. The heavy use of
tactical MHE would have a negative effect on its performance
once materiel was offloaded in the AOA. The use of such
equipment would be necessary, though, for accelerating the
loading process.
In the simulation performed by SRI (6"} , the cargo
handling capability, and not the actual movement of materiel,
11

was determined to be the major constraint in meeting prescribed
timeframes for asset distribution.
A national mobilization would place the Marine Corps,
in competition for existing transportation resources and
could cause delays in the movement time between nodes. For
example, if two MAF ' s are involved in a European theater, the
need arises for a cross-country movement of I MAP. This
creates a need to consider available air and ground
transportation.
In addition to the movement requirements for
materiel from the MSCS ' s and FMF units, the need exists for
Class V materiel (ammunition) to be transported from the
various depots to the POE at Earle, N.J. Coordination is
essential for ensuring that these assets will be available to
units as they arrive in the AOA.
3. Movement from the POE to the AOA
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for
providing its own ships or commercial vessels: to allow for the
shipment of cargo across the ocean. If air transportation is
feasible (i.e., there exists a secure place to land), the
Military Airlift Command can be utilized for cargo trans-
portation. The coordination for such movements is provided
by the MTMC {6:Y-2).
Risk are inherent with both modes in a wartime situation,
and it is not the purpose here to analyze what measures would
have to be taken to allow for reliable delivery of required
materiel to the AOA. It is known that the ?^iarine Corps is
78

not the sole user of these resources. The JGS is responsible
for assigning priorities for available transportation to the
services in accordance with applicable contingency plans [6:v-5J
The characteristics of the materiel to be shipped is
an important factor for consideration. Since cargo space is
at a premium, embarkation must be performed efficiently
regarding the size and shape of the cargo. As a consequence,
the Marine Corps should be well-versed on the current status
of service-wide efforts regarding containerization, materiel
weight and cube control, and packaging. They must ensure that






A properly developed system of prepositioned war reserve
materiel will provide logistical support during the initial
stages of an amphibious operation. Subsequent logistical
support is dependent on resupply. The essential considerations
in resupply are the determination of requirements , acquisition
of assets, development of a systematic means of withdrawing
and distributing assets, and, finally, the development of an
orderly system of inventory management and control in the AOA.
The stock held in the general account and in the operational
deployment blocks is designed to provide a source of replenish-
ment, while the mount-out stocks are designed to support
contingency operations during the first sixty days of combat.
While FMF commanders are authorized to mix this mount-out
with operational stock, resupply capability would be adversely
affected if mount-out proved to be inadequate and operational
stocks were needed prematurely.
The Marine Corps no longer "pushes" its replenishment
materiel to the AOA in the form of precalculated blocks
(identical to the initial mount-out package). The consumer
must now request his needs as they surface or as they are
anticipated (e.g., preventive maintenance requirements).
This new response system design calls for deployed forces
to place requisitions to the MCLSA at Albany, GA, using
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SASSY. Requests will be filled from any remaining P^/\fRIVIS
at the Supply Centers. These will primarily be those items
over which the Marine Corps is the IIVIM. In the event of
nonavailability, requisitions will be passed to the appropriate
IMM outside the Marine Corps.
The capability to effect a resupply of stock during
mobilization is an integral part of the war reserve require-
ment of these outside agencies. Currently, the Marine Corps
does not receive status reports from these IMMs , and no
guarantee exists that offers assurance as to the availability
of war reserve assets to be used for replenishment. These
IMM's are under similar fiscal constraints to those in the
Corps and maximum attainment is usually difficult. For this
reason some requirements may not be satisfied in the event
of mobilization. It is not known where the Marine Corps
would fall in a priority list for asset distribution or if
priority of contingencies will even be a consideration [l:^8-50j
The MTMC will be involved with the transportation of these
goods to the appropriate POE and then to the AOA. In the
event of a service-wide involvement, the time required to
transport replenishment supplied could be lengthy. This lead
time should, therefore, be considered a critical element in
the responsiveness of the resupply pipeline.
A major transportation problem will occur during the
transition from peacetime operations to combat operations.
For those items due to the general account, the expected lead
time will be based on peacetime delivery to a CONUS location.
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The need to redirect these ships to an overseas AOA
would create an additionail time delay. The length of
delay will be dependent on the capability of MTMC to
effectively redirect such shipment to the proper POE.
It should not be interpreted that using units will
route their requests directly to the MCLSA; SASSY is
designed to function in the deployed mode. If the logistics
element at the MAP, MAB , or IVLAU level does not have the
assets to fill a unit's demands, then it passes that request
to the MCLSA via the SMU. However, the intent is that the
stock will be on hand; and because of this, the logistics
element should be concerned with its performance
B. LEVELS SETTING
The way that SASSY establishes the resupply flow is
to designate items for stockage as they meet a prescribed
level of usage history. For an item to be held at the
General Account it must receive four demands in the previous
twelve-month period. Data is obtained from all units
supported by SASSY within the IVIAE.
The depth of stock maintained is based on a "days of supply"
model. This policy requires the computation of the average demand
per day. The quantity of an item authorized to be stocked is
comprised of an operating level, safety level, and the stock
required to accomodate lead time (order and ship time) demand.
Table V shows the breakdown of these levels within the ?MF.
The figures shown for lead times are estimates used when
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actual data does not exist or is considered to be unreliable.




OPERATING LEVEL 30 DAYS 60 DAYS
SAFETY LEVEL 30 DAYS 30 DAYS
LEAD TIME 30 DAYS 7 5 DAYS
TOTAL 90 DAYS I65 DAYS
DEPTH OF STOCK FOR FMF GENERAL ACCOUNTS (3)
TABLE V
For example, suppose the demand for an item is cited as
being four per month for a CONUS unit with no accurate
history on the lead time for this particular item. As a
result, ninety days (three months) or supply would be
required. Combining this level with the demand rate, it
follows that a quantity of twelve should be stocked. This
quantity will be known as the requisitioning objective (RO)*.
The reorder point (ROP) for items held in the general
account is defined to be the sum of the safety level and the
lead time demand. Continuing with the data used in the
previous example, the safety level and lead time would require
sixty days (two months) of supply. This would equate to a
ROP of eight for this particular item. When the inventory is
*In calculating the depth of those stocks to be available for
supporting a resupply pipeline, efforts should be made to
eximate actual average lead times from requisition initiation
to final receipt by the customer during a national mobilization.
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reduced to this quantity, action is taken to bring the level
back to the RO by ordering the quantity necessary to reach
RO level. This action is automatically performed by SASSY.
Since consumption of materiel in combat is increased, it
is necessary to somehow anticipate this usage and to augment
the required materiel support by a corresponding factor.
The Marine Corps currently uses a factor of 1.75 which is
applied to expected peacetime usage data prior to RO/ROP
calculation [6:VII-12j. The result is a substantial increase
in the number of items that qualify for stockage (and a
reduction of the percentage of requisitions for non-RO
items). In addition, the depth of stock is also affected
by the increased estimate of combat usage. The example above
would result in a forecasted demand rate of seven per month
when multiplied by the factor. A three-month supply require-
ment would create an RO of twenty-one and an ROP of fourteen.
C. OPTIMAL STOCKAGE POLICIES
The function of SASSY in the peacetime environment is
greatly constrained by fiscal considerations; and, as a
result, efforts are still being made to find the constrained
optimal stockage policy which will be the most responsive to
mobilization needs. Such an optimal policy must balance
fiscal constraints against the cost of not having assets on
hand for a demand. This implicit backorder cost will be
much larger during combat operations than during peacetime
for combat-essential items. Currently, non-optimal methods
8^

are available for obtaining high priority backorders
expeditiously in the event of war.
Efforts are also being made to determine how the existing
SASSY concept would function in a wartime scenario fo). The
SRI models allow for testing of various possible stockage
policies using existing range and depth criteria as well as
augmented levels that utilized combat usage factors. In
addition, variations can be made involving demand forecasting
methods, economic order quantity (EOQ) models, and lead time
consideration.
An additional concern is for the fiscal constraints of a
chosen stockage policy. The SRI models allow for parameters
involving ordering costs, holding costs, and shortage costs
to be analyzed. This provides a means for comparing the
effectiveness with the cost of maintaining a certain policy.
D. CARGO MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Transportation requirements for the movement of war
reserve materiel were discussed in the previous chapter.
•While a detailed analysis of the related problems involved
with cargo movement is beyond the scope of this presentation,
a few of the important considerations of the resupply process
are worth mentioning.
One of the most critical constraints involved with the
transport of resupply materiel will be cargo space aboard
vessels and aircraft. For this reason it will be imperative
to coordinate loading procedures to ensure the full loads




One means of maximizing the use of cargo space is the
utilization of standard containers. This allows for rapid
loading of cargo at both the POE and the AOA. At present
a standard container system does not exist DoD-wide. How-
ever, studies are being conducted to allow for adaptation of
such a system by the Marine Corps [6J. The drawback to
using containers is that supply sources must hold requested
items until a container can be completely filled |6:VII-^6j.
The locations for central container sites are being considered
by the Marine Corps to resolve this problem since most IMM's
do not have enough requests on a daily basis to fill one
another. For example, of eighteen IMM's utilized by the
Marine Corps, only three anticipated enough daily transactions
to fill a standard container [6:VII-^5J.
In addition, the characteristics of the standard con-
tainer (9'x9'x20') require special materiel handling
considerations to be taken at both CONUS and AOA loading
sites. The containers also create restrictions on the type
of vehicle that can be used to transport materiel. This will
be a major concern for the Marine Corps in the AOA.
E. RECEIPT 0? MATERIEL IN THE AOA
A rapid movement of the materiel is required once it
reaches the logistics activity at the AOA. The materiel cited
to replenish warehouse stock must be inducted into a locator
system, and those items ordered to fill backorders must be
routed to the customer.
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A large percentage of the materiel received will be
relatively easy to process. Included in this category is
Class V materiel, rations, fuel, and medical supplies, which
accounts for approximately 1 "^ percent of the replenishment
by weight (6:VII-39^ . The management of these items falls
under the control of specific units within the logistics
activity (e.g., Ammunition Company, Rations Company, Bulk
Fuel Company, and medical units with elements of the FSSG)
.
While Classes II, VII and IX make up only 11 percent of the
anticipated daily MAF replenishment requirem.ents l6:VII-39^,
these are the items that are managed by the SMU and constitute
the greater portion of the range of resupply items.
Because of the great number of line items to be processed
in a contingency, manual receipt processes are impractical.
Even the keypunch requirements for acknowledging receipt of
materiel would be too time-consuming. The possibilities for
improving the field warehousing procedures by using automated
techniques are endless. The need exists for the Marine Corps
to examine the feasibility of incorporating some of them
into its existing system in order to keep pace with a CONUS
resupply system that is becoming more sophisticated.
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YII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PROPER IDENTIFICATION OF MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS
It is very difficult for the Marine Corps to develop a
uniform system of computing war reserve requirements since it
dependent on various outside agencies for materiel support.
Since this dependency is not likely to be remedied, the
Marine Corps must ensure that its requirements are made
known to these agencies and that formal lines are established
that will allow for communication and coordination.
The Marine Corps' problems with requirements determination
are not limited to its dependency on outside agencies. Within
the Corps, various echelons of command are involved with this
process. HQMC is responsible for setting levels for some
classes of supply, MCLSA is tasked with computing other
requirements, and the FMF commanders have considerable input
to the process as well. In order for such a varied system to
function, all echelons must understand the purpose of the
system.
Since the purpose involves the Marine Corps capability
to accomplish assigned contingency missions, a process should
be developed that allows operational and logistical communities
to jointly analyze such contingencies and to determine a
coordinated materiel requirement based on the environment of




By developing such a process the valuable personal combat
experience of FMF commanders can be utilized. Such recommen-
dations should be shared among all commanders so that an
interaction process can take place. This is important since
not all commanding officers have first-hand knowledge of how
certain type units operate in a combat situation. The Marine
Corps is small enough to make this feasible.
B. PROBLEMS RELATING TO ASSET WITHDRAWAL
Just as the requirements must be determined with the
characteristics of the contingency in mind, so must the
methods for withdrawing these assets be designed. For
example, at present the Supply Centers do not have the means
to withdraw assets for individual active organizations. Assets
can be withdrawn only by MAF, MAB , or MAU where force size is
the criteria. If a detachment from one of these force levels
needs supplies, assets have to be extracted by a separate
process once the materiel reaches the FMF staging area. The
excess materiel is then either stored or rerouted depending
on the deployment requirements of the remainder of the force.
If contingency plans are to require force structures that
call for detached units to be assigned, then it is recommended
that edit codes, similar to those used for withdrawing
reserve unit's materiel, be incorporated in the withdrawal
design of the Supply Centers. If this is not feasible, then
some mechanism should be developed that would permit assets
to be separated out at the Supply Center prior to being
shipped to a staging area. This would prevent, for example
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the entire Glass VII (major end items) requirements for the
ground element of a MAU from being shipped when only the
materiel for one rifle company is needed.
The problem of asset positioning during peacetime also
needs to be considered in more detail by the Marine Corps.
The current status of asset allocation is not in keeping with
the desire "50-50" split between Barstow and Albany. It must
be determined what affect this would have on an emergency
withdrawal for a European contingency. The v/orst possible
case should be examined to determine how the time period
from withdrawal activation to embarkation at the POEs would
be affected. If the commitments could not be met, then it is
recommended that funds be programmed for the transshipment
of excess materiel from Barstow to Albany.
C. STOCKAGE POLIGIES
The stockage policies employed by the Marine Corps
will be a critical element in the success of both the
initial and resupply phases of the war reserve process.
These policies should provide the means for supplying materiel
to deployed units in an adequate and timely manner.
The criteria for determining range and depth of stock is
an essential consideration. Such criteria must consider
the trade-off between the impact on operational performance
of such a policy and the corresponding costs involved (e.g.
holding costs, ordering costs, implicit backorder costs).
In a wartime scenario these backorder costs will be greatly
increased by the fact that transportation considerations are
90

paramount, cargo space aboard vessels is a critical commodity,
and the needs of the forces are vital.
The current "days of supply" stockage policy places a
great deal of emphasis on the lead time. However, it has
been shown by SRI that SASSY has difficulty determining an
actual average lead time for individual items of supply. If
this lead time is consistently underestimated, the safety
level provided will be severely tested. The problem is
amplified if the uncertainty of demand is taken into account
since the safety level is designed to provide protection
against that occurrence as well.
The results of the SRI simulation of stockage policy
performance (^6:VIlJ are of great important to the Marine
Corps. The test utilized six different policies and recorded
performance and cost data for each policy. The policies that
utilized more sophisticated methods for demand forecasting,
lead time computation, and economic order quantity calculations
were very much superior to current policies being used. The
tests were run in both a peacetime and combat scenario
(increased demand rate) and measured such parameters as
fill rate, average duration of shortages, requisition response
time, and the various costs mentioned previously.
It is recommended that studies be continued by the Marine
Corps to determine an optimal stockage policy that could
function under existing fiscal constraints. In addition, it
is recommended that consideration be given to utilizing
such simulation packages as those developed by SRI to provide
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a means for continuous testing of the SASSY concept. This
would allow it to be refined to a degree suitable for
transition to a potential combat situation.
D. CARGO MOVEMENT PROBLEMS
Although, in most cases, the Marine Corps is not responsible
for the actual transportation of materiel from the supply
sources to the AOA, it must still be aware of the procedures
required to ensure that its cargo movement needs will be
satisfied. In addition the Marine Corps must understand its
regarding the loading and unloading of materiel at the
various nodes of the transportation system. Requirements for
manpower and materiel handling equipment need to be determined,
especially if organic equipment is to be utilized.
Simulations of asset withdrawal provide reasonable
estimations of the volume and tonnage of materiel requiring
transportation. The Corps should use this information in
developing procedures such that requirements will be handled
in a timely manner. It must know under what conditions it
might be required to use its own organic vehicles. Since
both Barstow and Albany are reasonably close to designated
POEs
, the use of Marine Corps vehicles is a definite
possibility. The fact that these same vehicles are later
to be used in the AOA should be considered. Allowances
should therefore be made for maintenance problems that could
occur. The impact of such problems on the success of the
contingency mission is very important.
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E. USE OF SIMULATION AND MOBILIZATION EXERCISES
Although it is difficult to simulate all combat conditions
on a computer, it is still possible to program typical
scenarios to form the basis for testing contingency plans
and the War Reserve System.
Simulations are increasingly important since the actual
physical withdrawal of materiel for the purpose of testing
capabilities would be too costly. This would definitely be the
case if a large scale mobilization exercise were performed.
The Marine Corps needs to determine if simulations can provide
the information necessary to evaluate the potential perform-
ance of the system. If it is not suitable, then the
feasibility of small scale mobilization exercises should be
examined.
An extensive number of simulations have already been used
in the SRI study f6J. They have been used to test the CONUS
transportation system, the work flow in the Supply Centers,
the inventory control system, the allocation of materiel
handling equipment at various nodes in the process, and the
flow of equipment to the AOA, among other things.
In addition to simulating Marine Corps procedures under
a mobilization scenario, programs should be devised by DoD
that simulate phases of a nationwide activation. In this
way, interaction between the services and the logistics
agencies could be observed and steps could be taken to
correct those areas where communications may break down. This
is important since the Marine Corps is unable to operate
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